Deceased organ donation is widely considered as a case of easy rescue―that is, a case in which A may bestow considerable benefits on B while incurring negligent costs herself. Yet, the policy implications of this observation remain unclear. Drawing on Christopher H. Wellman’s samaritan account of political obligations, the paper develops a case for a so-called opt-out system, i.e., a scheme in which people are defaulted into being donors. The proposal’s key idea is that we may arrange people’s options in (...) specific ways for the sake of others. (shrink)

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, large-scale research and pharmaceutical regulatory processes have proceeded at a dramatically increased pace with new and effective, evidence-based COVID-19 interventions rapidly making their way into the clinic. However, the swift generation of high-quality evidence and the efficient processing of regulatory authorisation have given rise to more specific and complex versions of well-known research ethics issues. In this paper, we identify three such issues by focusing on the authorisation of Molnupiravir, a novel antiviral medicine aimed (...) at reducing the ability of SARS-CoV-2 to multiply in the body, for clinical use by the National Health Service in England and the concomitant testing of Molnupiravir through the large-scale PANORAMIC randomised control trial. By analysing the ways in which the authorisation and clinical use of Molnupiravir complicate standard approaches to clinical equipoise, standard of care, and participant consent in the PANORAMIC randomised control trial we will explain some of ethical implications for clinical trials that aim to study the efficacy and safety of new COVID-19 and other therapeutics when conditional authorisation has already been granted and when such treatments have already been made available to patients by national health providers. (shrink)

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, large-scale research and pharmaceutical regulatory processes have proceeded at a dramatically increased pace with new and effective, evidence-based COVID-19 interventions rapidly making their way into the clinic. However, the swift generation of high-quality evidence and the efficient processing of regulatory authorisation have given rise to more specific and complex versions of well-known research ethics issues. In this paper, we identify three such issues by focusing on the authorisation of molnupiravir, a novel antiviral medicine aimed (...) at reducing the ability of SARS-CoV-2 to multiply in the body, for clinical use by the National Health Service in England and the concomitant testing of molnupiravir through the large-scale Platform Adaptive trial of Novel antiviRals for eArly treatMent of COVID-19 In the Community randomised control trial. By analysing the ways in which the authorisation and clinical use of molnupiravir complicate standard approaches to clinical equipoise, standard of care and participant consent in the PANORAMIC randomised control trial, we will explain some of ethical implications for clinical trials that aim to study the efficacy and safety of new COVID-19 and other therapeutics when conditional authorisation has already been granted and when such treatments have already been made available to patients by national health providers. (shrink)

William L. Rowe cites Stephen Wykstra's skeptical theism as the most powerful objection to the evidential argument. Initially, I object to skeptical theism on the basis that skeptical theism leads to moral paralysis. I then will conclude that the skeptical theist has other resources that enable the formation of a moral code.

Although thought experiments were first discovered as a sui generis methodological tool by philosophers of science (most prominently by Ernst Mach), the tool can also be found – even more frequently – in contemporary philosophy. Thought experiments in philosophy and science have a lot in common. However, in this chapter we will concentrate on thought experiments in philosophy only. Their use has been the centre of attention of metaphilosophical discussion in the past decade, and this chapter will provide an overview (...) of the results this discussion has achieved and point out which issues are still open. (shrink)

Smajdor argues that “recognition” is the solution to the “reifying attitude” that results from “the urge to protect ‘vulnerable’ people through exclusion from research”. Drawing on theories of reification, we argue that it is the concepts of autonomy and vulnerability themselves that have been reified, resulting in the impoverishment of approaches to autonomy at law and in research ethics. Overcoming such reification demands a deeper consideration of the grounds on which vulnerable individuals are owed recognition and thereby the forms such (...) recognition should take. Smajdor argues for a recognition that appeals to autonomy and that manifests in providing vulnerable individuals with the opportunity to assent. The problem is that this kind of recognition is dependent on a more fundamental kind. It is this second form of recognition that would need to do the heavy lifting for assent-based frameworks to avoid the same problems we find with consent. (shrink)

Author: Thomas Sören Hoffmann. Translated by Pedro Sepúlveda Zambrano.

In the luck egalitarian literature, one influential formulation of luck egalitarianism does not specify whether equalities that do not reflect people’s equivalent exercises of responsibility are bad with regard to inequality. This equivocation gives rise to two competing versions of luck egalitarianism: asymmetrical and symmetrical luck egalitarianism. According to the former, while inequalities due to luck are unjust, equalities due to luck are not necessarily so. The latter view, by contrast, affirms the undesirability of equalities as well as inequalities insofar (...) as they are due to luck. The symmetrical view, we argue, is by far the more compelling, both by internal luck egalitarian standards and in light of the external rightist emphasis on choice and responsibility to which luck egalitarianism may partly be seen as a response. Our main case for the symmetrical view is that when some people, against a background of equal opportunities, do not exercise their responsibility to the same degree as others, they cannot justifiably call for equalizing measures to be put in place. Indeed, such measures would be positively unfair. The symmetrical view, accordingly, rejects compensation in such cases, whereas the asymmetrical view, implausibly, enjoins it. We also examine two objections to this argument. First, that this view fails to qualify as genuinely egalitarian, instead collapsing the notion of equality into the notion of desert. Second, that the opposing asymmetrical view, in contrast to the symmetrical view, can draw support from its compatibility with sufficientarian concerns. Both objections are rebutted. We conclude that luck egalitarians are best served by endorsing the symmetrical, luck-neutralizing stance. (shrink)

Theoretical and practical activity have traditionally been understood as complementary activities: through theoretical activity the subject would internalize the external world, while through practical activity she would externalize her internal goals. Hegel scholars have often attempted to interpret the difference and relation between subjective and objective spirit on the basis of that way of understanding theoretical and practical activity. Such approach, however, raises serious exegetical and conceptual problems about the meaning and formal structure of Hegel´s entire philosophy of spirit. Indeed, (...) if what primarily characterizes subjective spirit is the activity of knowing considered as the process of idealization and internalization of the external world and what characterizes, in turn, objective spirit is the externalization of the goals of the will, how should we conceive within such explanatory framework the specificity of the acts of absolute spirit, that is to say, of the human behavior in art, religion, and philosophy? In my talk I will first attempt to clarify what exactly defines, according to Hegel, theoretical and practical activity, in order to develop on that basis an exegetical model that can satisfactorily account for Hegel´s peculiar periodization of the different forms of human activity. (shrink)

This essay narrates what I have learned from Søren Kierkegaard & John Dewey about teaching philosophy. It consists of three sections: 1) a Deweyan pragmatist’s translation of Kierkegaard’s religious insights on Christianity, as a way of life, into ethical insights on philosophy, as a way of life; 2) a brief description of the introductory course that I teach most frequently: Ethics, Happiness, & The Good Life; and 3) an exploration of three spiritual exercises from the course: a) self-cultivation by (...) means of writing in an Ethics Notebook, b) an “existential experiment” in which we practice one of Aristotle’s virtues for a week, and c) a 15-hour service-learning component. (shrink)

According to Kierkegaard, truth is superimposed on the objective character that encompasses historical investigation and speculative exercise, dialoguing with subjectivity and the limit-condition of interiority. Focusing on such existential-hermeneutic principle, the article points out spirituality as an epistemic-existential experience involving truth as a paradox in Kierkegaard, that overlaps the logical-discursive mediation and implies a dialectical-subjective construction that transcends reason historical-objective. Thus, characterizing spirituality as an epistemic-existential experience that contains non-rational evidence, the article resorts to Rudolf Otto's phenomenology to underline the (...) sacred and its absolute distinction from natural reality and its perceptible character, emphasizing the non-rational element and its supra-rational nature in the numinous, which escapes logical-rational processes and converges to the apprehension of the rational and the non-rational in the notion of Divinity. Therefore, if the relationship with God overlaps subjectivity and objectivity and overcomes the aforementioned epistemic structural scheme, the article, based on the philosophical theology of Paul Tillich, focuses on the concept of Spiritual Presence and on life without ambiguity, which implies the union transcendent and correlates agape and gnosis in an ecstatic-religious movement that encompasses the self-manifestation, self-revelation and self-communication of the Absolute and Transcendent. (shrink)

In Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard writes that Abraham intended to sacrifice Isaac for God’s sake as well as for his own sake. Drawing mainly on The Sickness unto Death I will argue that Kierkegaard construes Abraham as becoming a true self, that is, as someone who becomes self-transparent before God. What this means and how our relationship with God is supposed to be involved in the process of becoming a self is the focus of my paper. While various articles have (...) been written on that topic, my aim here is to give the most charitable interpretation of Kierkegaard’s theses and the theological concepts involved. (shrink)

Segundo Kierkegaard, a verdade se sobrepõe ao caráter objetivo que encerra desde uma investigação histórica até um exercício especulativo, guardando correspondência com a subjetividade em um movimento que implica a condição-limite da interioridade. Detendo-se em tal princípio hermenêutico-existencial, o artigo assinala a espiritualidade enquanto experiência epistêmico-existencial envolvendo a verdade como paradoxo em Kierkegaard, que se sobrepõe à mediação lógico-discursiva e implica uma construção dialético-subjetiva que transcende a razão histórico-objetiva (ou finita). Dessa forma, caracterizando a espiritualidade enquanto experiência epistêmico-existencial que encerra (...) como único tipo de evidência a evidência de caráter não racional, o artigo recorre à perspectiva fenomenológica de Rudolf Otto, que sublinha o sagrado e a sua distinção absoluta em relação à realidade natural e ao seu caráter perceptível em uma construção que enfatiza o elemento não racional e a sua natureza suprarracional e implica o numinoso, que escapa aos processos lógico-racionais e, emergindo como a priori, converge para a apreensão do racional e do não racional na noção da Divindade. Assim, se a relação com Deus se sobrepõe às fronteiras que encerram a subjetividade e a objetividade, convergindo para a superação do referido esquema estrutural epistêmico, o artigo, baseado na perspectiva teológico-filosófica de Paul Tillich, detém-se no conceito de Presença Espiritual que, caracterizando a vida sem ambiguidade, implica a união transcendente, correlacionando ágape e gnosis enquanto experiência epistêmico-existencial envolvendo a relação com o sagrado como presença de Deus através de um movimento extático-religioso que converge para a automanifestação, a autorrevelação e a autocomunicação do Absoluto e Transcendente como Deus. (shrink)

Soren Kierkegaard (b. 1813–d. 1855), widely regarded as the father of existentialism, distinguishes three stages of authentic personhood: aesthetic, ethical, and religious. Kierkegaard seems to suggest that people progress through these stages in life. Steve Pavlina, on the other hand, argues that people can create their meaning through conscious actions that require reflection. Using the analytic method, this paper explores Kierkegaard’s theory of stages and man’s path to authentic personhood, comparing and contrasting it with Steve Pavlina's path to enlightenment. An (...) endeavor will be made to show how Kierkegaard's authentic personhood is similar in many ways to Steve Pavlina’s path to enlightenment and also reconcile the struggle for truth found in both of these individuals' philosophies. The conclusion reached is that these two ideologies prove fruitful in other fields of research, e.g. in understanding the stages in the development of the child. -/- . (shrink)

In this article, I examine the possible thought experimenting qualities of Soren Kierkegaard's novel Fear and Trembling and in which way it can be explanatory. Kierkegaard's preference for pseudonyms, indirect communication, Socratic interrogation, and performativity are identified as features that provide the narrative with its thought experimenting quality. It is also proposed that this literary fiction functions as a Socratic-theological thought experiment due to its influences from both philosophy and theology. In addition, I suggest three functional levels of the fictional (...) narrative that, in different ways, influence its possible explanatory force. As a theoretical background for the investigation, two accounts of literary cognitivism are explored: Noel Carroll's Argument Account and Catherine Elgin's Exemplification Account. In relation to Carroll's proposal, I conclude that Fear and Trembling develops a philosophical argumentation that is dependent on the reader's own existential contribution. In relation to Elgin's thought, the relation between truth and explanatory force is acknowledged. At the end of the article, I argue that it is more accurate to see the explanatory force of Fear and Trembling in relation to its exploratory function. (shrink)

Sören Halldén’s logic of nonsense is one of the most well-known many-valued logics available in the literature. In this paper, we discuss Peter Woodruff’s as yet rather unexplored attempt to advance a version of such a logic built on the top of a constructive logical basis. We start by recalling the basics of Woodruff’s system and by bringing to light some of its notable features. We then go on to elaborate on some of the difficulties attached to it; on our (...) way to offer a possible solution to such difficulties, we discuss the relation between Woodruff’s system and two-dimensional semantics for many-valued logics, as developed by Hans Herzberger. (shrink)

This chapter analyses Soren Kierkegaard's thoughts and opinions about ancient Greek philosophy. It examines the significance of Kierkegaard's references to Greek philosophy in his writings and suggests that his use of classical thought was part of his effort to define his own intellectual project. The chapter investigates how Greek philosophy influenced Kierkegaard's works and views about ethics, existential thought, Socratic faith, love, and virtue, and also considers what Kierkegaard believed was the legacy of ancient Greek philosophy.

Soren Kierkegaard was a profound and prolific writer in the Danish “golden age” of intellectual and artistic activity. His work crosses the boundaries of philosophy, theology, psychology, literary criticism, devotional literature and fiction. Kierkegaard brought this potent mixture of discourses to bear as social critique and for the purpose of renewing Christian faith within Christendom. At the same time he made many original conceptual contributions to each of the disciplines he employed. He is known as the “father of existentialism”, but (...) at least as important are his critiques of his peer Hegel and of the German romantics, his contributions to the development of modernism, his literary experimentation, his vivid re-presentation of biblical figures to bring out their modern relevance, his invention of key concepts which have been explored and redeployed by thinkers ever since, his interventions in contemporary Danish church politics, and his fervent attempts to analyse and revitalise Christian faith. Kierkegaard is regarded by modern contemporaries as somewhat of an intellectual ‘time bomb’, although writing in the early 19th century, Kierkegaards ideas did not explode upon the western intellectual world until the 20th century. Both the contemporary philosophical and theological scenes have been profoundly influenced by this explosion, and chances are that in coming generations writers will still draw insight on some of Kierkegaards unique ideas. His philosophy on religious belief took centuries of philosophical discourse concerning the existence of God and took the discussion in a completely new direction. Up until the writing of Kierkegaard religious philosophy was centered around attempts to ‘prove’ Gods existence via means of a logically consistent, well reasoned argument ala Aquinas’ Five Ways, Anselm etc. To vindicate religious belief, one would traditionally offer some form of structured argument in favour of deity that appealed to reason e.g First Cause, Ontological argument etc, a field which is now known as apologetics-the intellectual defense of religious belief. For Kierkegaard however, reason and faith are a false dichotomy- rational argument and human reason are somewhat irrelevant to religious belief,and this plays a central role in his philosophical doctrine which is an attempt to vindicate Christian faith through his thesis that ‘truth is subjectivity’(Schaeffer, 1982). Firstly, what will be discussed here is a critical evaluation of Kierkegaards philosophy of religious belief as expounded in his works Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Secondly, a look at some responses and criticisms of Kierkegaards religious views- as he was a notoriously ambiguous and vague writer, he wrote the majority of his famous works pseudonymously, his work has been frequently scrutinised. Finally, concluding with an analysis of his philosophy and if we can consider his work a complete vindication of religious belief. (shrink)

In his Edifying Discourses, Soren Kierkegaard published a sermon entitled ‘The Unchangeableness of God’ in which he reiterated the dogma which dominated Catholic, Protestant and even Jewish expressions of classical supernaturalist theology from the first century A.D. until the advent of process theology in the twentieth century. The dogma that as a perfect being, God must be totally unchanging in every conceivable respect was expressed by Kierkegaard in such ways as: He changes all, Himself unchanged. When everything seems stable and (...) in the overturn of all things, He remains equally unchanged; no change touches Him, not even the shadow of a change; in unaltered clearness He, the father of lights, remained eternally unchanged. 1. (shrink)

The philosopher Soren Kierkegaard argued in his 1844 work ‘The Concept of Anxiety’ that anxiety is a vital aspect of the human condition, a consequence of freedom and choice. In this article I argue that this, along with other key concepts of anxiety identified by Kierkegaard including the avoidance of past negative experiences, and education in choice outcomes, are supported by modern theories of anxiety using evidence from social and experimental psychology as well as psychiatry. A proposed future body of (...) work involving anxiety and free will stemming from Kierkegaard’s philosophy is also discussed. (shrink)

Esta reflexión plantea el problema que se da al querer dar cuenta del individuo, como existencia, de manera sistemática en el terreno de las tendencias lógicas de la ética. Sören Kierkegaard, será la guía para plantear que tal pretensión es dañina y se presenta como la imposibilidad para la afirmación de la subjetividad como vitalidad abierta siempre a las posibilidades que ofrece la condición humana. Para el desarrollo de este planteamiento trataremos de confrontar algunos planteamientos de Kierkegaard -sobre todo el (...) de la irreductibilidad de la existencia a sistema- con la eticidad hegeliana en particular, para mostrar cómo se revienta el postulado de un sistema de la existencia. Este reventarse se debe entender no como destrucción de lo dado sino como enfrentamiento de ello y conducción hasta sus últimas consecuencias donde se hace manifiesta la imposibilidad de encerrar la existencia en la estrecha posición de la ética como ciencia normativa, es decir como imperativo de comportamiento y direccionamiento moral de la subjetividad por los carriles del pensamiento que absorbe al ser y que postula a la razón como la directriz de todo proyecto vital. (shrink)

Ölümcül Hastalık Umutsuzluk adlı eserinde umutsuzluğu, ben’in bir hastalığı ve kendine yönelen bir ilişkinin sonucu olarak ele alan Danimarkalı filozof Søren Aabye Kierkegaard, bu hastalığın kişide üç farklı şekilde görülebileceğini öne sürmüştür: “(a) bir ben’i olduğunun farkında olmayan umutsuz kişi, (b) kendisi olmak isteyen umutsuz kişi ve (c) kendisi olmak istemeyen umutsuz kişi.” Kierkegaard’a göre kendi ben’ininden kurtulmak isteyen kişi, “olmak istediği ben” hâline gelemediği için olduğu ben’ine katlanamamakta ve bu nedenle umutsuzluk yaşamaktadır. Bu çalışma kapsamında Kierkegaard’ın benlik ve (...) umutsuzluk ilişkisi üzerine yaptığı bu tespitin, sosyal psikoloji alanının önde gelen araştırmacılarından biri olan Edward Tory Higgins’ın Benlik Uyuşmazlıkları Kuramı üzerinden okunabileceği öngörülmektedir. Higgins, geliştirdiği kuramda çoklu bir benlik ayrımına gitmekte ve benliği gerçek benlik, ideal benlik ve olması gereken benlik olmak üzere üç alana ayırmaktadır. Bu ayrıma göre gerçek benlik, kişinin sahip olduğunu düşündüğü özelliklerin; ideal benlik, kişinin kendisi olmak için idealde sahip olmayı arzu ettiği özelliklerin; olması gereken benlik ise kişinin taşımak zorunda olduğunu düşündüğü özelliklerin bir bütününü temsil etmektedir. Söz konusu özellikler, kişinin kendi kişisel bakış açısına dayalı olabileceği gibi başkalarının bakış açısından da kaynaklanabilmektedir. Higgins’a göre ikili benlik durumları arasındaki uyuşmazlık (örneğin gerçek benlik-ideal benlik ya da gerçek benlik-olması gereken benlik) kişide, kendi beklentilerini ya da başkalarının beklentilerini karşılamada yetersiz kaldığı yönünde negatif duyuşlar yaratmaktadır. Bu duyuşlar arasında depresyonun bir parçası olan umutsuzluk da yer almaktadır. Şimdiki çalışma Kierkegaard’ın tasvir ettiği “olmak istediği ben hâline gelemediği için olduğu ben’ine katlanamayıp umutsuzluğa yakalanan” kişinin içinde bulunduğu durumu, Higgins’ın öne sürdüğü “gerçek benlik-ideal benlik uyuşmazlığının depresyonla (dolayısıyla umutsuzlukla) ilişkili olabileceği” argümanıyla ilişkili bir biçimde ele almayı ve bu yolla benlik ve umutsuzluk ilişkisini felsefe ve psikoloji disiplinlerinin kesişiminde incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. (shrink)

Quantum Theory has created new perspectives on reality in the human mind. The fact that the micro-world has different identities than the macro-world, as it emerges with Quantum Theory, has made the subject of reality, which underlies everything, more complex. Quantum Theory has demolished the deterministic world view drawn by classical physics, revealing a reality of reality. In addition, it has brought up new questions about customary laws to date, including logic rules because of the peculiarities of the electrons, which (...) appear to have multiple characteristics at the same time. Absurdism is the philosophical view based on the confrontation between the human's aspirations and the desire for happiness and the indifference of the world. The absurdism considered in existentialism that emphasizes subjectivity, although it is based on Sören Kierkegaard, was identified with Albert Camus. The absurdity of Albert Camus was the basis of his philosophy. In this study, it will be examined whether the characteristics of quantum theory, which are evaluated as strange, support absurdity. For this purpose, firstly Quantum Theory and its scientific results, which were evaluated as strange, were revealed. Later, existentialism, absurdity of Albert Camus, and the absurdity of Jean Paul Sartre, explained the relationship of Quantum Theory with these views. (shrink)

This book is co-written in a lively, engaging form by Karen Carr, from the discipline of religious studies and Philip Ivanhoe, whose background is in the disciplines of religious studies and Asian languages and philosophy. Unlike typical co-authorship, these two authors write separate pieces about Zhuangzi and Soren Kierkegaard and then together offer a combined vision. Refreshingly, the emphasis is on contrast of exemplars of two different and irreconcilable ways instead of comparison between similar thinkers. The two authors are to (...) be congratulated for this in-depth interchange both with each other and with these two iconoclastic thinkers. It is hoped that this innovative genre-a study of contrasts that partially crosses disciplines, maintains the integrity of each coauthor, and yet attempts a comprehensive vision-will provide inspiration for comparative studies in the future. (shrink)

Max Jammer claimed that, "There can be no doubt that the Danish precursor of modern existentialism and neo-orthodox theology, Soren Kierkegaard, through his influence on Bohr, affected also the course of modern physics to some extent." Despite Jammer's failure to supply sufficient evidence for this claim, I argue that it is not completely off base. In particular, I argue that Kierkegaard and Bohr belong to a common philosophical tradition, and I begin to investigate some of the themes that characterize this (...) tradition. (shrink)

Seit Beginn der frühen Neuzeit ist das naturwissenschaftliche Verfahren maßgeblich durch ein neues Konzept geprägt: das Konzept des experimentellen, gestalterischen Eingriffs in die Natur. Es geht nun nicht mehr darum, eine Geschichte der "freien und ungebundenen Natur" (Bacon) zu erzählen, die in ihrem eigenen Lauf belassen und als vollkommene Bildung betrachtet wird. Es geht vielmehr darum, der "gebundenen und bezwungenen Natur" (Bacon) vermittels der experimentellen Tätigkeit des Menschen die Geheimnisse zu entreißen. Diese technisch-praktische Konzeption grenzt sich explizit von den klassischen (...) kontemplativen Wissenschaftsvorstellungen der Antike ab. Wie es Kant paradigmatisch in Bezug auf Bacon formuliert hat, ist diese "Revolution der Denkart" maßgeblich durch ein gewandeltes Verständnis des Verhältnisses des Menschen zur Natur geprägt. Der Mensch als Experimentator hat für Kant nicht mehr die "Qualität eines Schülers", der sich passiv von der Natur belehren läßt und an ihrem "Leitbande" (Kant) gegängelt wird. Seine neu gewonnene Autorität verleiht ihm vielmehr den Status eines Richters, der nun die Natur nötigen kann, auf gestellte Fragen zu antworten. Die Laborforschung der modernen Naturwissenschaft ist von den Formen der alten Naturwissenschaft so weit entfernt, daß sie den Vorwurf auf sich zog, sie untersuche Artekakte, aber nicht Natur. Die grundlegenden Theorien über Natur können in der Regel nur unter den künstlichen Bedingungen des Labors aufgestellt werden. Daraus darf aber nicht geschlossen werden, die anhand von Laborphänomenen aufgestellten und getesteten Theorien handelten nicht von der Natur außerhalb der Labore. Aber ihrer exakten und detaillierten Anwendung auf Prozesse außerhalb der Labore stehen eine Fülle von Schwierigkeiten entgegen. Insofern markiert das Labor sehr wohl eine Grenze exakter Naturforschung, die für den Umgang der wissenschaftlich-technischen Zivilisation mit der Natur wichtige Konsequenzen hat. Inhalt: Kristian Köchy / Gregor Schiemann: Natur im Labor Lothar Schäfer: Die Erscheinung der Natur unter Laborbedingungen Holm Tetens: Das Labor als Grenze der exakten Naturforschung Christoph Rehmann-Sutter: Genes in Labs - Concepts of Development and the Standard Environment Kristian Köchy: Lebewesen im Labor. Das Experiment in der Biologie Jutta Weber: Mannigfaltige Techno-Naturen. Von epistemischen Modellsystemen und situierten Maschinen Thomas Sören Hoffmann: Gezeigte versus sich zeigende Natur. Eine Skizze im Blick auf das Verhältnis von Labor und Natur Klaus Michael Meyer-Abich: Laborforschung im Erkenntnishandeln der Experimentiergesellschaft. Eine holistisch-pragmatische Perspektive für die Wissenschaftstheorie. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como objetivo determinar el fundamento teológico del concepto de soberanía propuesto por el jurista alemán Carl Schmitt. Según nuestra hipótesis, tal fundamento teológico se encuentra en la filosofía del pensador danés Søren Kierkegaard, quien, en diferentes obras, desarrolló los importantes conceptos de excepción, decisión y suspensión teleológica de la ética en relación a la experiencia religiosa de la repetición. Como veremos, tales conceptos forman parte del fundamento teológico de la famosa definición schmittiana de la soberanía: (...) “soberano es quien decide sobre el estado de excepción”, la cual define el decisionismo del jurista alemán. Así, por medio del concepto de decisión, extraído de la obra kierkegaardiana e introducido en la doctrina de la soberanía, Schmitt logra tres objetivos. Por un lado, no solo inicia la crítica al parlamentarismo liberal y al Estado burgués de Derecho, sino que revela el fundamento teológico-existencial de la unidad política del Estado moderno. En segundo lugar, en el marco jurídico-político, actualiza la teología fideísta desarrollada por Kierkegaard en su obra. Finalmente, en el marco teológico-metafísico, introduce el papel de la decisión como actualizador del rol público de la trascendencia en la modernidad secularizada frente a la reserva escatológica de la teología. Para lograr nuestro objetivo, utilizaremos el método de la analogía conceptual teológico-política creado y aplicado por el mismo Carl Schmitt a la historia de la soberanía europea. (shrink)